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Automatic Search for Related-Key Differential Characteristics in Byte-Oriented Block Ciphers: Application to AES, Camellia, Khazad and Others

机译:以面向字节的块Ciphers自动搜索相关关键差分特性:对AES,Camellia,Khazad等的应用程序

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While differential behavior of modern ciphers in a single secret key scenario is relatively well understood, and simple techniques for computation of security lower bounds are readily available, the security of modern block ciphers against related-key attacks is still very ad hoc. In this paper we make a first step towards provable security of block ciphers against related-key attacks by presenting an efficient search tool for finding differential characteristics both in the state and in the key (note that due to similarities between block ciphers and hash functions such tool will be useful in analysis of hash functions as well). We use this tool to search for the best possible (in terms of the number of rounds) related-key differential characteristics in AES, byte-Camellia, Khazad, FOX, and Anubis. We show the best related-key differential characteristics for 5, 11, 14 rounds of AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 respectively. We use the optimal differential characteristics to design the best related-key and chosen key attacks on AES-128 (7 out of 10 rounds), AES-192 (full 12 rounds), byte-Camellia (full 18 rounds) and Khazad (7 and 8 out of 8 rounds). We also show that ciphers FOX and Anubis have no related-key attacks on more than 4-5 rounds.
机译:虽然在单一秘密关键场景中的现代密码的差异行为相对良好地理解,并且可以随时可用的简单技术,用于计算安全下限的简单技术,与相关关键攻击的现代块密码的安全性仍然非常临时。在本文中,我们通过呈现一个有效的搜索工具来对块密码的第一步迈出块密码的安全性,通过呈现一个有效的搜索工具,用于在状态和键中找到差异特征(注意,由于块密码和散列函数之间的相似性,因此工具在分析哈希函数方面也可用)。我们使用此工具来搜索AES,Byte-Camellia,Khazad,Fox和Anubis中的相关关键差分特征。我们分别展示了分别为5,11,14°OES-128,AES-192,AES-256的最佳相关关键差分特性。我们使用最佳的差异特征来设计AES-128的最佳相关关键和选择的关键攻击(10轮中的7轮),AES-192(完整12轮),Byte-Camellia(完整18轮)和Khazad(7 8轮中有8个)。我们还表明Ciphers Fox和Anubis对超过4-5轮没有相关关键攻击。

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