Asymmetric Interactions between Cooperators and Defectors for Controlling Self-repairing

摘要

In an information network composed of selfish agents pursuing their own profits, undesirable phenomena such as spam mail occur if the profit sharing and other game structures permit such equilibriums. This note focuses on applying the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma to control a network of selfish agents by allowing each agent to cooperate or to defect. Cooperation and defection respectively correspond to repair (using the self resource) and not repair (thus saving the resource) in a self-repair network. Without modifying the payoff, the network will be absorbed into the state where all the agents become defectors and abnormal. Similarly to kin selection, agents favor survival of neighbors in organizing these two actions to prevent the network from being absorbed if payoffs are measured by summing all the neighboring agents. Even with this modification, the action organization exhibits spatial and temporal adaptability to the environment.