Radio Frequency Identification Devices:Effectiveness in Improving Safeguards at Gas-Centrifuge Uranium-Enrichment Plants

摘要

Recent advances in radio frequency identification devices(RFIDs)have engendered a growing interest among international safeguards experts.Potentially,RFIDs could reduce inspection work,viz.the number of inspections,number of samples,and duration of the visits,and thus improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards.This study systematically examined the applications of RFIDs for IAEA safeguards at large gas-centrifuge enrichment plants(GCEPs).These analyses are expected to help identify the requirements and desirable properties for RFIDs,to provide insights into which vulnerabilities matter most,and help formulate the required assurance tests.This work,specifically assesses the application of RFIDs for the“Option 4”safeguards approach,proposed by Bruce Moran,U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission(NRC),for large gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment plants~[1].The features of “Option 4”safeguards include placing RFIDs on all feed,product and tails(F/P/T)cylinders, along with RFID readers in all F/P/T stations and accountability scales.Other features of Moran’s“Option 4”are Mailbox declarations,monitoring of load-cell-based weighing systems at the F/P/T stations and accountability scales,and continuous enrichment monitors.Relevant diversion paths were explored to evaluate how RFIDs improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards.Additionally,the analysis addresses the use of RFIDs in conjunction with video monitoring and neutron detectors in a perimeter-monitoring approach to show that RFIDs can help to detect unidentified cylinders.