This paper describes the social evolution of an environment where all individuals are repeating patterns of behaviour. The paper follows Axelrod's work [1] of computer simulations of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), which is widely regarded as a standard model for the evolution of cooperation. Previous studies by Axelrod [2], Hirshleifer and Coll [3], Lindgren [4], Fogel [5], Darwen and Yao [6] focused on strategies that are history dependent. In other words, these strategies use the outcome of the opponent's past game history in making a decision on a given move. This includes the most well-known strategy, tit-for-tat.The way strategies are encoded in the computer program reflects the model's assumption concerning individual decision-making. In this paper, we study environments where all players are simply repeating patterns of behaviour without using past game history. In doing so, a genetic algorithm is used to evolve such strategies in a co-evolution environment. Simulations indicate that such an environment is harmful to the evolution of cooperation.
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