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A time memory trade off attack against A5/1 algorithm

机译:针对A5 / 1算法的时间内存交易攻击

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Two types of attacks against the GSM security algorithm, A5/1, are discussed. The A5/1 system consists of three LFSRs (linear feedback shift registers) which have lengths of 19, 22 and 23 bits respectively. So, the total length of the three registers is 64 bits. The purpose of these attacks is to obtain the initial state of the LFSRs just after the encryption key (Kc) and frame number are loaded, in the light of known plaintext. Both attacks depend on the time-memory attack principle. In other words, the solution space of A5/1, as 2/sup 64/, becomes realizable with M /spl ap/ 2/sup 34.955/ as memory and T /spl ap/ 2/sup 28.365/ as time complexity by distributing the solution space between time and memory optimally.
机译:讨论了针对GSM安全算法,A5 / 1的两种类型的攻击。 A5 / 1系统由三个LFSR(线性反馈移位寄存器)组成,其分别具有19,22和23位的长度。因此,三个寄存器的总长度为64位。这些攻击的目的是在加载加密密钥(KC)和帧编号时获得LFSR的初始状态,鉴于已知的明文。这两次攻击都依赖于时间记忆攻击原理。换句话说,A5 / 1的溶液空间为2 / sup 64 /,可通过M / SPL AP / 2 / SUP 34.955 /作为存储器和T / SPL AP / 2 / SUP 28.365 /作为时间复杂度来实现最佳时间和内存之间的解决方案空间。

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