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The Process Hazards Analysis Program, Bridging Accident Analyses and Operational Safety

机译:过程危险分析计划,桥接事故分析和操作安全

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The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the Plutonium Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Technical Area 55 (TA-55) was recently revised and submitted to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). As part of this effort, over 70 Process Hazards Analyses (PrHAs) were written and/or revised over the 6 years preceding the FSAR revision. The TA-55 facility is a research, development, and production nuclear facility that primarily supports U.S. defense and space programs. Nuclear fuels and material research; material recovery, refining and analysis; and the casting, machining, and fabrication of plutonium components are some of the activities conducted at TA-55. These operations involve a wide variety of industrial, chemical, and nuclear hazards. Operational personnel along with safety analysts work as a team to prepare the PrHA. The PrHAs describe the process operation; identify associated hazards; and analyze the hazards, including determining hazard scenarios, their likelihood, and their consequences. In addition to identifying the interaction of the process to facility safety systems, structures, and components, operational-specific protective features are part of the PrHA. This information is rolled up to determine bounding accidents as well as preventive and mitigating systems, structures, and components. Further detailed accident analysis is performed for the bounding accidents and included in the FSAR. The FSAR is part of the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) approved by the DOE that defines the safety envelope for all facility operations and is essentially a license to operate. The value of formal safety analyses to the daily controls on hazardous operations for worker safety is often questioned. The safety of day-to-day operations is based on Hazard Control Plans (HCPs). Hazards are first identified in the PrHA for the specific operation, then used as input to the HCP. Specific protective features important to worker safety are incorporated so that workers can readily identify the safety parameters of their work.
机译:最近修订并提交给美国能源部(DOE)的最终修订并提交了洛杉矶阿拉莫斯国家实验室,技术领域55(TA-55)的最终安全分析报告(FSAR)。作为这项努力的一部分,在FSAR修订前的6年内,编写和/或修订了70多个过程危险分析(PRHAs)。 TA-55设施是一个研究,开发和生产核设施,主要支持美国国防和空间计划。核燃料和材料研究;材料恢复,精炼和分析;钚组分的铸造,加工和制造是在TA-55处进行的一些活性。这些行动涉及各种工业,化学和核危害。运营人员以及安全分析师作为一支球队准备PRHA。 PRHA描述过程操作;识别相关的危险;并分析危险,包括确定危险情景,可能的可能性及其后果。除了识别工艺对设施安全系统,结构和组件的相互作用之外,还有操作特定的保护特征是PRHA的一部分。卷起该信息以确定有限事故以及预防和减轻系统,结构和组件。对边界事故进行进一步的详细事故分析,并包括在FSAR中。 FSAR是由DOE批准的DOE批准的文档安全分析(DSA)的一部分,该母鹿定义了所有设施运营的安全信封,并且基本上是运营的许可。正式安全分析对工人安全危险行动的日常管制的价值往往受到质疑。日常运营的安全基于危险控制计划(HCP)。首先在PRHA中识别出特定操作的危害,然后用作HCP的输入。对工人安全重要的特定保护功能被纳入,以便工人可以容易地确定其工作的安全参数。

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