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Detection of information-leak hardware Trojan in AES cryptographic circuits

机译:检测AES加密电路中的信息泄漏硬件特洛伊木马

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Modern Integrated Circuits (ICs) are becoming increasingly vulnerable to malicious inclusions and alterations (hardware Trojans) due to the globalization of semiconductor design and fabrication processes, which brings in the requirement for reliable detection of hardware Trojans made in an untrusted fabrication facility during post-manufacturing test. In this paper, we present a new method for Trojan detection that calculates temporal features of IDDT and IDDQ signals, then applies mRMR (minimum-redundancy maximum-relevance) algorithm to select feature subset, and finally uses Mahalanobis distance calculation to detect Trojan circuits. Experimental results featuring an information-leak hardware Trojan inserted into a 128-bit AES cryptographic circuits on Xilinx Spartan-3E FPGAs demonstrate the simplicity and effectiveness of the proposed approach for Trojan detection.
机译:由于半导体设计和制造工艺的全球化,现代集成电路(ICS)越来越容易受到恶意夹杂物和改变(硬件特洛伊木马),这带来了在后 - 制造测试。 在本文中,我们为特洛伊木马检测提供了一种新方法,用于计算IDDT和IDDQ信号的时间特征,然后应用MRMR(最小冗余最大相关)算法来选择特征子集,最后使用Mahalanobis距离计算来检测特洛伊木马电路。 实验结果以信息泄漏硬件特洛伊木马在Xilinx Spartan-3E FPGA上插入128位AES加密电路中的信息泄漏硬件特洛伊木马证明了特洛伊木马检测方法的简单性和有效性。

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