The correct functioning of inter-domain routing is of vital importance to the ever expanding Internet. As a common threat to the Internet, prefix hijackings often hijack traffic destined to some Autonomous Systems(ASes), leading to routing black holes or traffic interception. In this paper, we study two typical categories of prefix hijackings, namely false origin hijacking and man-in-the-middle interception, by extensive simulations. Our simulations are based on a new model which takes both the hierarchical Internet structure and the AS connectivity degrees into consideration. With this model, we explore the attacking/hijacking power of different ASes and their resisting power to this attack, where different categories of hijackings exhibit different characteristics. In addition, we also confirm that our results still hold considering various factors in the real Internet, including hidden links, prefix distribution, and RPKI, a countermeasure to prefix hijackings that is undergoing an active deployment in inter-domain routing. Some explanations and case studies are given to help better understanding of our results, which we hope will facilitate the deployment of RPKI and inspire new research.
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