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Detection of Pilot Spoofing Attack Over Frequency Selective Channels

机译:频率选择性信道上的欺骗性攻击检测

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In a time-division duplex (TDD) multiple antenna system, the channel state information (CSI) can be estimated using reverse training. A pilot contamination (spoofing) attack occurs when during the training phase, an adversary also sends identical training (pilot) signal as that of the legitimate receiver. This contaminates channel estimation and alters the legitimate precoder/beamformimg design, facilitating eavesdropping. Past approaches to pilot spoofing detection are limited to flat fading channels. In this paper we propose a novel approach for detection of pilot spoofing attack over frequency selective channels, with unknown channels and channel lengths, except that an upperbound on the number of channel taps is assumed to be known. The proposed approach is illustrated by numerical examples and they show the efficacy of the proposed approach. A method to estimate Bob's channel regardless of the spoofing attack, is also presented and illustrated via simulations.
机译:在时分双工(TDD)多天线系统中,可以使用反向训练来估计信道状态信息(CSI)。在训练阶段,当敌方也发送与合法接收者相同的训练(飞行员)信号时,就会发生飞行员污染(欺骗)攻击。这会污染信道估计,并改变合法的预编码器/ beamformimg设计,从而有助于窃听。过去的导频欺骗检测方法仅限于平坦衰落信道。在本文中,我们提出了一种新颖的方法,用于在未知信道和信道长度的情况下检测频率选择性信道上的导频欺骗攻击,只是假定信道抽头数量的上限是已知的。数值示例说明了该方法的有效性,它们显示了该方法的有效性。通过仿真还提出并说明了一种估计鲍勃信道的方法,该方法不受欺骗攻击的影响。

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