Securing Module-Less Synthesis on Cyberphysical Digital Microfluidic Biochips from Malicious Intrusions

摘要

Digital Microfluidic biochips (DMFB's) lack the ability to recover from the errors incurred at assay runtime, which leads to erroneous assay results. Cyberphysical DMFB (CP-DMFB) can overcome such issues with the provision of real-time modification of its operations via interface sensors. In this work, we have modified the Module Less Synthesis (MLS) process for ensuring better security measures and demonstrated various attack scenarios for Modified-MLS (MMLS) method on a CP-DMFB. We have also proposed a checkpoint based novel attack detection method for MMLS technique. The effectiveness of our technique is checked with available benchmark assays and achieved results show much faster assay execution time and around 80% intrusion (error) detection rate on an average.