A Phased Approach to Cyber Hardening a Machinery Control System (MCS) - CG47 Class MCS Implementation

摘要

Unlike the Navy Network Connected Centrally Managed (NCCM) implementation of cyber requirements, implementation on a ship machinery control system (MCS) presents special implications. Implementing Defense Information Security Agency (DISA) requirements on the NCCM network may follow an approach of "meet the cyber requirements and fix the operational issues later." This approach may not be feasible for critical shipboard machinery control systems (MCS) where errors can lead to system non-availability or, in severe circumstances, equipment and personnel safety issues. If not done as a part of an overall software development strategy, security patching and Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs) can cause issues with the functionality of a complex and integrated MCS. With the potential for extensive testing required to ensure system functionality, meeting STIG and Information assurance Vulnerability Management (IAVM) requirements requires an approach that will allow for a robust and development process while not impeding fielding plans and delivery schedules.Random implementation of all the requirements for typical internet connected devices can cripple components, connections, or whole systems. To maintain the integrity and reliability of a MCS, a phased approach to cyber hardening implementation is utilized by the CG47 MCS In-Service Engineering Agent (ISEA).The objectives of this paper include a presentation of the CG47 MCS methodology of cyber hardening, including the process of planning, testing, and implementing cyber security updates for the MCS. The paper will address ways to implement cyber security in phases with consideration for flexibility to meet schedules and fielding plans. The paper will also discuss some of the issues that may arise during cyber-hardening of a MCS. The concentration ofthis paper is the CG47 MCS methods applied to the operator console software system. The greatest chance for vulnerability to cyber compromise exists on the Microsoft Windows based operator consoles. While physical methods for system isolation and security are also implemented, the goal of this paper is to discuss the methodology, processes, and techniques of operator console cyber hardening.Key Points to be presented include1. MCS operational needs and basic system security.2. CG MCS generic process for cyber implementation.3. Scan, remediation, and testing.4. Patching and STIGing of systems and issue mitigation.5. Lessons learned from CG MCS design and ongoing problems.