Modern water distribution systems (WDSs) largely depend on computer networks and industrial control systems for monitoring and operational purposes. Although the adoption of these cyber-physical components has improved the reliability and quality of service, such progressive computerization may render WDSs vulnerable to cyber and cyber-physical attacks. The spectrum of potential threats is very broad, with several attacks able to cause the disclosure of critical information or service disruption at different levels-a water supply interruption, for instance. These attacks usually target the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system-i.e., the centralized computer system supervising the whole infrastructure-or the programmable logic controllers (PLCs) that locally operate pumps and valves. In this work, we introduce an EPANET-based toolbox that allows simulating the effects of cyber-physical attacks on a WDS. Plausible attack scenarios to network SCADA and PLCs are implemented in EPANET to simulate the response of a large WDS and assess how it diverges from normal operating conditions.
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