Attack on a DFA Protected AES by Simultaneous Laser Fault Injections

摘要

This paper demonstrates a Fault Attack on anAES core protected by an infection type countermeasure. The redundant AES is implemented on a Xilinx Spartan-6FPGA, with a feature size of 45 nm. By injecting exactlythe same fault in both state registers of the redundant implementation using lasers, we are able to annul the protection added by the countermeasure and thus perform a successful Differential Fault Analysis. This requires a high precision double laser setup in order to hit two different locations on the chip at the same point intime. With a priori knowledge about the location of bothstate registers, we were able to generate applicable faultyciphertexts within minutes. Our results show that forapplications demanding a high level of security, relyingon a duplication of hardware is not sufficient.