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Internal attacks in anonymous publish-subscribe P2P overlays

机译:匿名发布-订阅P2P覆盖中的内部攻击

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Privacy, in particular anonymity, is desirable in Online Social Networks (OSNs) like Twitter, especially when considering the threat of political repression and censorship. P2P-based publish-subscribe is a well suited paradigm for OSN scenarios as users can publish and follow topics of interest. However, anonymity in P2P-based publish-subscribe (pub-sub) has been hardly analyzed so far. Research on add-on anonymization systems such as Tor mostly focuses on large scale traffic analysis rather than malicious insiders. Therefore, we analyze colluding insider attackers in more detail that operate on the basis of timing information. For that, we model a generic anonymous pub-sub system, present an attacker model, and discuss timing attacks. We analyze these attacks by a realistic simulation model and discuss potential countermeasures. Our findings indicate that even few malicious insiders are capable to disclose a large number of participants, while an attacker using large amounts of colluding nodes achieves only minor additional improvements.
机译:在Twitter之类的在线社交网络(OSN)中,尤其是考虑到政治压制和审查制度的威胁时,需要隐私,尤其是匿名性。基于P2P的发布-订阅非常适合OSN场景,因为用户可以发布和关注感兴趣的主题。但是,到目前为止,几乎没有分析基于P2P的发布-订阅(pub-sub)中的匿名性。对诸如Tor之类的附加匿名化系统的研究主要集中于大规模流量分析,而不是恶意内部人员。因此,我们将更详细地分析合谋的内部攻击者,这些攻击者基于时间信息进行操作。为此,我们对通用匿名发布服务器系统进行建模,提出攻击者模型,并讨论定时攻击。我们通过一个逼真的仿真模型来分析这些攻击,并讨论潜在的对策。我们的发现表明,几乎没有恶意内部人员能够披露大量参与者,而使用大量共谋节点的攻击者仅获得了较小的额外改进。

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