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Secret key agreement under an active attack in MU-TDD systems with large antenna arrays

机译:具有大型天线阵列的MU-TDD系统在主动攻击下的秘密密钥协议

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We consider secret key agreement (SKA) over time division duplex for a multi-user wireless system, in which a base station (BS) equipped with a large antenna array remotely generates different secret keys for multiple users in the system. The BS can have the SKA over downlink broadcast channels with precoding based on uplink training from the multiple users. In this case, unfortunately, an eavesdropper can effectively perform a pilot contamination attack (PCA) by transmitting a targeted user's training sequence for the purpose to steer beam direction toward the eavesdropper. As the beam direction becomes under the eavesdroppers control, this PCA can result in information leakage from the BS to the targeted user. In order to fend off this PCA, we derive PCA detectors based on generalized likelihood ratio test and propose a countermeasure. For the performance analysis, we consider the outage probability and show that it decreases exponentially with the number of antennas at the BS, which cannot be achieved by the conventional SKA.
机译:我们考虑了用于多用户无线系统的时分双工上的秘密密钥协议(SKA),其中配备有大型天线阵列的基站(BS)远程为系统中的多个用户生成不同的秘密密钥。 BS可以基于来自多个用户的上行链路训练,通过预编码在下行链路广播信道上具有SKA。在这种情况下,不幸的是,窃听者可以通过发送目标用户的训练序列以使光束方向指向窃听者,来有效地执行飞行员污染攻击(PCA)。随着波束方向处于窃听者的控制之下,此PCA可能导致信息从BS泄漏到目标用户。为了抵御这种PCA,我们基于广义似然比检验推导了PCA检测器,并提出了对策。对于性能分析,我们考虑了断电概率,并表明其随BS天线数量的增加呈指数下降,这是常规SKA无法实现的。

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