The service-oriented paradigm offers support for engineering service-based systems based on service composition. QoS (Quality of Service)-aware service composition chooses a set of services to collectively construct a service-based system, while satisfying global QoS constraints and budget restriction. The service providers naturally are self-interested and strive to maximize their own utilities. Existing approaches use iterative combinatorial auction to address the problem. However, truthful bidding is not optimal strategy for service providers in these approaches. In this paper, we propose a multi-round Vickrey auction to choose an optimal service provider for each task while satisfying our global QoS constraints and budget restriction, and show there may exist a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, in which the service providers will not choose strategically to stay silent and will truthfully bid. Finally, the experimental results show that our approach outperforms the existing combinatorial auction-based approaches.
展开▼
