Enhancing PRESENT-80 and Substitution-Permutation Network Cipher Security with Dynamic 'Keyed' Permutation Networks

摘要

This work presents a countermeasure for thwarting side-channel assisted differential plaintext attacks on hard-ware based cryptographic algorithms employing a substitution-permutation network structure. The countermeasure we present, dynamic keyed permutation networks, is integrated directly into a PRESENT-80 OpenCore and using the Cadence GSCLIB 45 nanometer standard cell library we perform attacks on both a modified and unmodified PRESENT-80. Ultimately, we will show that not only does this method successfully thwart differential plaintext attacks but it is also lightweight and increases resilience of the algorithm. Additionally, we demonstrate how PRESENT-80 can be attacked without the need of side-channel techniques and how the presented countermeasure further increases resilience and prevents such an attack.