Due to severe limitations in their computational and storage capabilities, many low-cost RFID tags have been shown to implement quite weak authentication protocols, largely due to weakness in their pseudorandom number generators (PRNG). This aim of this is to examine the PRNG in use within the authentication protocol of the new NXP MIFARE Ultralight C RFID low-cost card. The article investigates the nonces generated by the card during the authentication protocol to assess their randomness, and to test any possible attacks down this path. We confirm the validity of the methodology by applying similar techniques to the Mifare 1K Classic, confirming previously discovered weaknesses. We conclude that in the light of our analysis, the PRNG of the Ultralight C is a major improvement over that of the Mifare 1K, and that the nonces generated by the former can't be easily distinguished from truly random ones.
展开▼
机译：由于其计算和存储能力的严格限制，许多低成本的RFID标签已显示出实现相当弱的身份验证协议，这主要是由于其伪随机数生成器（PRNG）的弱点。目的是检查新型恩智浦MIFARE Ultralight C RFID低成本卡的身份验证协议中使用的PRNG。本文研究了在身份验证协议期间卡生成的随机数，以评估其随机性，并测试此路径下可能发生的攻击。我们通过对Mifare 1K Classic应用类似的技术来确认该方法的有效性，从而确认先前发现的弱点。我们得出的结论是，根据我们的分析，Ultralight C的PRNG是对Mifare 1K的PRNG的重大改进，并且前者产生的随机数很难与真正的随机数区分开。
展开▼
