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Mechanism Design of Multi-Attribute Auction Based on Venture Capital

机译:基于风险投资的多属性拍卖机制设计

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The venture enterprise' value is not fully revealed as a result of asymmetric information in venture capital exiting market. To solve this problem, this paper studies the venture capital equity trading mechanism design under the assumption of the IPV model based on multi-attribute auction theory. To make our research closer to reality, this paper relaxes previous assumption and studies the venture capital equity trading in the case of affiliated values and establishes the corresponding multi-attribute auction model. The study enriches the venture capital exit research content, and provides a theoretical guidance to venture capital exit with the auction approach.
机译:由于风险资本退出市场的信息不对称,风险企业的价值并未得到充分体现。为了解决这个问题,本文在基于多属性拍卖理论的IPV模型的假设下,研究了风险投资股权交易机制的设计。为了使我们的研究更接近现实,本文放宽了先前的假设,研究了关联价值情况下的风险资本股权交易,并建立了相应的多属性拍卖模型。该研究丰富了风险资本退出的研究内容,并通过拍卖的方式为风险资本退出提供了理论指导。

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