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Study on cooperation system for airdromes construction in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei area

机译:京津冀地区机场建设合作体系研究

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This article constructs the complete information static game to disclose the decisive factor on the cooperation and forms the point. the airdrome construction in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei area. When Beijing Capital International Airdrome builds the second airdrome, the more income Tianjin and Shijiazhuang airdrome lose or the less income the national economy growth bring them, the more possibility the cooperation strategy become the only Nash equilibrium, meanwhile, the strong competition from the high speed railway net to civil aviation will cause the cooperation among the airdromes in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei area. On the contrary, the game has two Nash equilibrium strategies more possibly, meanwhile, the complementarities between strategies make the low payoff equilibrium moving to the cooperation one with high payoff. When the central government normalizes the performance appraisal to the local government or subsidize the region neither building the new airdrome or enlarging the old one, the goal of cooperation is easy to achieve.
机译:本文构建了一个完整的信息静态游戏来揭示合作的决定性因素并形成重点。京津冀地区的机场建设。当北京首都国际机场建设第二个机场时,天津和石家庄机场收入减少或国民经济增长带来的收入减少,合作战略成为唯一纳什均衡的可能性就越大,同时,来自高速竞争的激烈竞争通往民航的铁路网将导致京津冀地区各机场之间的合作。相反,博弈更有可能具有两种纳什均衡策略,同时,策略之间的互补性使低收益均衡向高收益合作转移。当中央政府对地方政府进行绩效考核或对地区进行补贴,而不是建立新机场或扩大旧机场时,合作目标很容易实现。

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