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Study on Logistics Project Team Member's Incentive MechanismBased on Reputation

机译:物流项目团队成员激励机制研究基于信誉

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Using the expected utility, game theory and dynamic programming methods, considered both ability reputation and cooperation reputation in the logistics project team members of incentive mechanism. Research shows that: First, when probability of cooperation of team member drops, degree of patience of non-cooperation member who pretends to be cooperation member will enhance, and non-cooperation member is more willing to choose cooperation behavior. Second, the lower the team member's professional ability or ability reputation, the bigger is team member's optimal incentive coefficient in the tth milestone. Third, the smaller the proportion of investment funds for output, the bigger is the team member's optimal incentive coefficient in the t th milestone. Fourth, the more unstable the social economy, the bigger is the team member's optimal incentive coefficient in the t th milestone.
机译:使用预期效用,博弈论和动态规划方法,在激励机制的物流项目团队成员中同时考虑了能力声誉和合作声誉。研究表明:首先,当团队成员合作的可能性下降时,假装为合作成员的非合作成员的耐心程度将会增强,并且非合作成员更愿意选择合作行为。其次,团队成员的专业能力或能力声誉越低,在第t个里程碑中,团队成员的最佳激励系数就越大。第三,投资资金占产出的比例越小,团队成员在第t个里程碑中的最优激励系数就越大。第四,社会经济越不稳定,团队成员在第t个里程碑中的最佳激励系数就越大。

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