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False data injection attack in smart grid topology control: Vulnerability and countermeasure

机译:智能电网拓扑控制中的假数据注射攻击:漏洞和对策

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摘要

Cyber security is a crucial factor for modern power system as many applications are heavily relied on the result of state estimation. Therefore, it is necessary to assess and enhance cyber security for new applications in power system. As an emerging technology, smart grid topology control has been investigated in stability and reliability perspectives while the associated cyber security issue is not studied before. In successful false data injection attack (FDIA) against AC state estimation, attacker could alter online stability check result by decreasing real power flow measurement on the switching target line to undermine physical system stability in topology control. The physical impact of FDIA on system control operation and stability are illustrated. The vulnerability is discussed on perfect FDIA and imperfect FDIA against residue based bad data detection and corresponding countermeasure is proposed to secure critical substations in the system. The vulnerability and countermeasure are demonstrated on IEEE 24 bus reliability test system (RTS).
机译:网络安全是现代电力系统的关键因素,因为许多应用严重依赖于国家估计的结果。因此,有必要评估和增强网络安全为电力系统的新应用。作为新兴技术,在稳定性和可靠性视角下,智能电网拓扑控制已经在稳定性和可靠性视角下进行了调查,而之前未进行相关的网络安全问题。在成功的假数据注入攻击(FDIA)反对AC状态估计,攻击者可以通过减少切换目标线上的实际功率流量来改变在线稳定性检查结果,以破坏拓扑控制中的物理系统稳定性。图说明了FDIA对系统控制操作和稳定性的身体影响。在完美的FDIA和不完美的FDIA上讨论了漏洞,防止基于残留的不良数据检测,并提出了相应的对策来保护系统中的关键变电站。 IEEE 24总线可靠性测试系统(RTS)对漏洞和对策进行了说明。

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