The China’Logistics Outsourcing Mechanism Design among the Cooperative Relations of Supply Chain(Ⅱ): Based on the Model of the Bilateral Principal-agent

摘要

This paper analyzes the two shippers and two logistics provider bilateral principal-agent model and its equilibrium under perfect and imperfectly information situation respectively. We find that the logistics provider’s efforts achieved the optimal level in order to fully grab informa tion rent when each shipper paid to their logistics pro riders respectively under the condition of perfect infor marion. This paper discusses the problems that the mar ket equilibrium depends on whether the services from two logistics providers are mutually complementary or substitute when the logistics provider has private infor marion. Then we discuss the local second-order condi tions according to the types of logistics providers. We find that the more information the logistics providers as agent show to their shipper in the two shippers and two logistics providers mechanism designs,the more out sourcing contract he gets from the shipper,and the more available service to the shipper at a higher level,while the other offers more available service to his shipper at a higher level Owing to space constraints,we only discuss the bilateral principal-agent model of two shippers and two logistics providers,the bilateral principal-agent model of two shippers and one logistics provider as well as the unilateral rincipal-agent model of single logistics provider will be discussed in other papers.