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The Analysis of Credit Moral Hazard in Commercial Banks Based on Game Theory

机译:基于博弈论的商业银行信用道德风险分析。

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With fleetly developing of finance market in 21st century,the scale of the credit business in commercial banks gradually extends. At the same time,the risk of commercial bank becomes both complicate and diversiform in the credit market. Compared with other hazards,moral hazard is the most difficult to control. Applying the Game theory,the article constructs the game models of implementation process of loans and repayment phase between enterprises and commercial banks respectively. According to the analysis of the above-mentioned mod els,the article obtains the major factors which lead to moral hazard formed by enterprise loan from commercial banks,and provides some pertinence precaution meas ures,such as supervising and guarding vocational work,perfecting laws and making sure the validity of guaranty.
机译:随着21世纪金融市场的飞速发展,商业银行信贷业务的规模逐渐扩大。同时,商业银行的风险在信贷市场上既复杂又多样化。与其他危害相比,道德危害是最难控制的。运用博弈论,分别构建了企业与商业银行之间贷款执行阶段和还款阶段的博弈模型。通过对上述模型的分析,得出了导致商业银行向企业贷款形成道德风险的主要因素,并提供了对职业工作的监督和防范,完善法律法规的防范措施。确保担保的有效性。

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