THE 2003 AND 2006 HIGH ENRICHED URANIUM SEIZURES IN GEORGIA

摘要

An analysis of the two most recent nuclear trafficking incidents involving high enriched uranium (HEU) - the seizure of 80 g of HEU in Georgia in 2006 and 170 g of HEU on the Georgian-Armenian border in 2003 -demonstrates that these incidents share some features with cases in the early 1990s: the trafficking appears to be supply driven, the material involved is of Russian or suspected Russian origin, and no end-users or actual buyers were identified or apprehended. At the same time, the 2003, 2006 and other recent incidents demonstrate new features: the involvement of middlemen, smaller quantities of material seized, material marketed as samples, the use of 'vintage' contraband from relatively old stocks, and 'Muslim countries/organizations' named by the culprits as intended destinations. Investigations of the two HEU seizures in Georgia were complicated by lack of transparency and poor international cooperation, particularly in the 2006 incident; problems with timely reporting of the incidents to the IAEA; and the apparent interference of political factors in the timely investigation and reporting of the two incidents. As a result, questions remain about such basic facts as the amount and characteristics of the material, its origin, the names and background of accomplices, transport routes and the whereabouts of additional quantities of the contraband. The paper provides recommendations on information collection and sharing on nuclear trafficking, and argues that reliable mechanisms for international cooperation in the investigation of nuclear smuggling cases still need to be established.