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Research of Leader-Follower Problem to Tradable Emission Permits

机译:排污权交易中的首尾问题研究

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Although tradable emission permits is a technique that controls environment pollution by means of market prompting, it isn’t merely individual action that the sewage enterprises do under freedom market. In the total process of bringing tradable emission permits into effect, the function of government is still important.The environment department what is affiliated with government constitutes lots of macro-policies just as environment quality standard, the distribution and tradition regulations of emission permits; represents the nation’s interest. And every sewage enterprise is microcosmic system which represents its own interest. In fact, the process of tradable emission permits is a process of “game”, and “people” in the “game” are government and sewage enterprises. This paper aiming at the relation between upper-level decision-maker: environment department representing the nation interest and lower-level decision-maker: sewage enterprise representing its own interest, discusses and investigates it, and constitutes the principle and leader-follower integer linear Bilevel programming model of tradable emission permits.
机译:尽管可交易的排放许可是一种通过市场推动来控制环境污染的技术,但排污企业在自由市场下所做的不仅仅是个人行为。在实行可交易的排放许可证的整个过程中,政府的职能仍然很重要。代表国家的利益。每个污水处理企业都是代表自己利益的微观系统。实际上,可交易的排放许可证的过程是一个“博弈”的过程,而“博弈”中的“人”是政府和排污企业。本文针对上级决策者:代表国家利益的环境部门与下级决策者:代表自身利益的污水处理企业之间的关系,进行了探讨和研究,并构成了原则和领导者整数线性模型。可交易排放许可证的双层规划模型。

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