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Game theory based evaluation of PSS control effort

机译:基于博弈论的PSS控制效果评估

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This paper argues that the control action provided by power system stabilizers (PSSs) be considered as an ancillary service and proposes a method for evaluating the contribution of each PSS to system stability and the system savings thus resulting. Therefore, it is of importance to appropriately choose a criterion to assess the performance of each PSS, so that a proper allocation of savings can eventually be attained. For a more comprehensive assessment of power system behavior, various performance criteria are implemented and, ultimately, a composite savings allocation function is constructed. A cooperative game theory based approach using the Shapley value concept is developed in this paper to identify the marginal contribution of each PSS to the total control effort. Accordingly, the method outlines appropriate allocation of payment to each generator involved in providing the PSS-control. Additionally, in order to test the robustness of the allocation thus evolved, a set of contingencies is considered to determine if and how the allocation would be affected.
机译:本文认为,电力系统稳定器(PSS)所提供的控制作用应被视为辅助服务,并提出一种评估每个PSS对系统稳定性的贡献以及由此产生的系统节省的方法。因此,它是重要的适当选择的标准来评估每个PSS的性能,以便最终可以达到节约的合理分配。为了更全面地评估电力系统的行为,将实施各种性能标准,并最终构建复合的节能分配功能。本文开发了一种基于Shapley值概念的基于合作博弈的方法,以识别每个PSS对总控制量的边际贡献。因此,该方法概述了向涉及提供PSS控制的每个产生者的付款的适当分配。另外,为了测试如此演变的分配的鲁棒性,考虑了一组突发事件以确定是否以及如何影响分配。

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