首页> 外文会议>Chinese Control Conference >Some explanatory notes on game theoretical method to solve a MOP for the flow structure in bubble columns
【24h】

Some explanatory notes on game theoretical method to solve a MOP for the flow structure in bubble columns

机译:关于解决气泡塔流动结构的MOP的博弈论方法的一些解释性说明

获取原文

摘要

The mechanism of the meso-scale structure in multi-scale reaction systems in the bubble columns is of great significance in chemical engineering. A typical analytical method to investigate the mechanism for the regime transitions of the flow in the system is through the EMMS (energy-minimization-multi-scale) model. In the EMMS model, by introducing the stability condition to reflect the idea of `compromise-in-competition between dominant mechanisms', the researchers can transform the multiple objectives (energy consumptions) problem (MOP) in the system into a single objective problem (SOP) to be optimized. In our previous works, we formulated the multi-objective problem (MOP) in the gas-liquid system as a noncooperative game between the tendencies of small and large bubbles. Since there are two players and three free variables, the problem arises to distribute appropriate strategies to the players. Based on this idea, we have build two different game models by two different ways of strategy distribution. They showed different systems states at GNE while the first game model seemed to agree with the prediction of EMMS model on the transition regime. In this paper, we will give some explanations on these findings. We will show that the optimal point of the SOP in EMMS model differs with the GNE of the first game model actually. This reveals the complexity of the multi-phase reaction systems and implies that the mechanism of the meso-scale structure is absolutely not naive and needs more further investigation.
机译:鼓泡塔中多尺度反应体系中介观结构的机理在化学工程中具有重要意义。研究系统中流态转变的机制的典型分析方法是通过EMMS(能量最小化-多尺度)模型。在EMMS模型中,通过引入稳定性条件以反映“主导机制之间的折衷”概念,研究人员可以将系统中的多个目标(能耗)问题(MOP)转换为单个目标问题( SOP)进行优化。在先前的工作中,我们将气液系统中的多目标问题表述为小气泡和大气泡趋势之间的非合作博弈。由于有两个参与者和三个自由变量,因此出现了将适当的策略分配给参与者的问题。基于这个想法,我们通过两种不同的策略分配方式构建了两种不同的博弈模型。他们在GNE展示了不同的系统状态,而第一个博弈模型似乎与EMMS模型对过渡制度的预测相符。在本文中,我们将对这些发现给出一些解释。我们将证明EMMS模型中SOP的最佳点实际上与第一个博弈模型的GNE不同。这揭示了多相反应体系的复杂性,并暗示中尺度结构的机理绝对不是幼稚的,需要进一步研究。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号