Market Equilibrium Analysis Considering Electric Vehicle Aggregators and Wind Power Producers Without Storage Capabilities

摘要

This paper is devoted to analyze market equilibrium solutions when new market agents, such as renew- able/intermittent producers, elastic demands and electric vehicles, are exposed to time-varying Locational Marginal Prices in the context of a competitive electricity market. Two economic equilibrium models are studied in detail. First, we analyze the perfect competition solution driven by a benevolent planner in which real and reactive power dispatches as well as the battery charge-discharge schedule aims to maximize the global social welfare. Secondly, we also address the monopoly solution when the total profit of electric vehicle (EV) aggregators and renewable generators are maximized considering that both producers belong to the same firm. The perfect competition and monopoly system models were applied to an illustrative 3-node test system. Solution shows that under perfect competition, the battery dispatch is smooth in order to get maximum social welfare and therefore minimal grid losses. Conversely, when battery and renewable power injections are managed by only one firm capable to alter the locational prices, the maximum firm profit is get by producing a non-smooth battery dispatch and high grid losses.