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Conjunctive Keywords Searchable Encryption Scheme Against Inside Keywords Guessing Attack from Lattice

机译:内部关键词猜测格攻击的联合关键词可搜索加密方案

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Public-key encryption with conjunctive keywords search (P-ECKS) is an extension of public-key encryption with keywords search (PEKS), which can realize the efficient search of the encrypted data stored in the cloud server and keep the privacy of these data during the search phase. However, there exists an inherent security issue for the typical PEKS schemes that they cannot prevent the inside keywords guessing attack (KGA). Moreover, most PEKS schemes were constructed based on the hardness of some number theory problems which can be solved in polynomial time using the quantum computer. Thus once large-scale quantum computers are built, these PEKS schemes aren't secure in the future quantum era. To address the above issues, this paper proposes a lattice-based PECKS scheme which can resist inside KGA. Its security can be reduced to the hardness of LWE problem and ISIS problem, thus it can resist quantum computing attack. We also give a comparison with other searchable encryption schemes on the computational cost of the main algorithms and the size of related parameters.
机译:联合关键字搜索(P-ECKS)的公共密钥加密是带有关键字搜索(PEKS)的公共密钥加密的扩展,可以实现对存储在云服务器中的加密数据的高效搜索,并保持这些数据的私密性在搜索阶段。但是,典型的PEKS方案存在一个固有的安全问题,即它们无法阻止内部关键字猜测攻击(KGA)。此外,大多数PEKS方案都是基于一些数论问题的难点而构建的,这些问题可以使用量子计算机在多项式时间内解决。因此,一旦构建了大规模量子计算机,这些PEKS方案在未来的量子时代就将变得不安全。为了解决上述问题,本文提出了一种可抵抗KGA内部的基于晶格的PECKS方案。它的安全性可以降低到LWE问题和ISIS问题的难度,因此可以抵抗量子计算攻击。我们还就其他主要算法的计算成本和相关参数的大小与其他可搜索的加密方案进行了比较。

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