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Regulatory Perspective on Nuclear Cyber Security: The Fundamental Issues

机译:核网络安全的监管观点:基本问题

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We are living in a digital and information-driven age; hence need to retain information on virtually every aspect of our lives, nuclear information inclusive. Security in computer systems is strongly related to the notion of dependability. For such system to be reliable and secure in a nuclear facility, unauthorized logic changes must be prevented - confidentiality, field device inputs and outputs must remain immutable throughout their usable lifetime -integrity, and everything should remain in an operable state - availability. The dynamic and complex nature of cyber threats has made it a serious challenge to secure computer systems in nuclear facilities. Despite the adoption of varied cyber security services, policies, mechanisms, strategies and regulatory frameworks like confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation, encipherment, defence-in-depth, design basis threat, IAEA technical guidance documents such as: GS-R-1, GS-R-2, NSS13, NSS17, NST036, NST045, and NST047, IEEE standard 7-4.3.2-2010, NIST SP 800-53, NIST SP 800-82, NEI 08-09 and country-specific requirements such as: 10 CFR 73.54, 10 CFR 73.1, RG 5.71 (USNRC), KINS/RG-N08.22 (South Korea) respectively, the threats remain persistent. This paper is aimed at providing a regulatory perspective on nuclear cyber security, its relationship to nuclear safety and security, regulatory requirements and cyber security global best practice recommendations and strategies to prevent its occurrence. This is imperative as Nigeria prepares to join the league of countries with operational nuclear power plants and reactors by its approval and adoption of the nuclear power programme roadmap in 2007.
机译:我们生活在一个数字和信息驱动的时代。因此需要保留有关我们生活几乎各个方面的信息,包括核信息。计算机系统中的安全性与可靠性概念密切相关。为了使这种系统在核设施中可靠可靠,必须防止未经授权的逻辑更改-机密性,现场设备输入和输出在其整个使用寿命内(完整性)必须保持不变,并且一切都应保持在可操作状态(可用性)。网络威胁的动态性和复杂性使其成为确保核设施中计算机系统安全的严峻挑战。尽管采用了各种网络安全服务,政策,机制,策略和监管框架,例如机密性,完整性,可用性,不可抵赖性,加密,纵深防御,设计基准威胁,原子能机构技术指导文件,例如:GS-R -1,GS-R-2,NSS13,NSS17,NST036,NST045和NST047,IEEE标准7-4.3.2-2010,NIST SP 800-53,NIST SP 800-82,NEI 08-09和特定国家/地区要求分别为:10 CFR 73.54、10 CFR 73.1,RG 5.71(USNRC),KINS / RG-N08.22(韩国),威胁仍然持续存在。本文旨在提供有关核网络安全,其与核安全和核安全的关系,监管要求和网络安全全球最佳实践建议以及防止其发生的策略的监管观点。这是当务之急,因为尼日利亚准备在2007年批准并通过核电计划路线图,以加入拥有可运行核电厂和反应堆的国家联盟。

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