Can Caesar Beat Galois? Robustness of CAESAR Candidates Against Nonce Reusing and High Data Complexity Attacks

摘要

The Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability and Robustness (CAESAR) has as its official goal to "identify a portfolio of authenticated ciphers that offer advantages over [the Galois-Counter Mode with AES]" and are suitable for widespread adoption." Each of the 15 candidate schemes competing in the currently ongoing 3rd round of CAESAR must clearly declare its security claims, i.e. whether it can tolerate nonce misuse, and what is the maximal data complexity for which security is guaranteed. These claims appear to be valid for all 15 candidates. Interpreting "Robustness" in CAESAR as the ability to mitigate damage when security guarantees are void, we describe attacks with 64-bit complexity or above, and/or with nonce reuse for each of the 15 candidates. We then classify the candidates depending on how powerful does an attacker need to be to mount (semi-)universal forgeries, decryption attacks, or key recoveries. Rather than invalidating the security claims of any of the candidates, our results provide an additional criterion for evaluating the security that candidates deliver, which can be useful for e.g. breaking ties in the final CAESAR discussions.