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Verifiability Experiences in Government Online Voting Systems

机译:政府在线投票系统的可验证性经验

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Since the introduction of verifiability in the online government elections of Norway in 2011, different governments have followed similar steps and have implemented these properties in their voting systems. However, not all the systems have adopted the same levels of verifiability nor the same range of cryptographic mechanisms. For instance, Estonia (2013) and New South Wales (Australia, 2015) started by adopting individual verifiability to their systems. Switzerland updated its regulation in 2014 to include individual and universal verifiability in order to by-pass the previous limitation of voting online up to 30% of the electorate. Geneva and Swiss Post voting systems are adapting their systems to this regulation and currently provide individual verifiability (and universal in the case of Swiss Post). In this exploratory paper, we study the different approaches followed by the election organizers that offer online voting, their current status and derived future tendencies.
机译:自从2011年挪威在线政府选举引入可验证性以来,不同的政府都采取了类似的步骤并将这些属性应用于其投票系统。但是,并非所有系统都采用相同级别的可验证性或相同范围的加密机制。例如,爱沙尼亚(2013)和新南威尔士州(澳大利亚,2015)首先是对其系统采用个人可验证性。瑞士在2014年更新了法规,纳入了个人和普遍的可验证性,以绕过之前最多30%的选民在线投票的限制。日内瓦和瑞士邮政的投票系统正在对其系统进行调整,以适应该法规,并且目前提供个人可验证性(对于瑞士邮政而言,这种验证是通用的)。在这份探索性论文中,我们研究了选举组织者遵循的不同方法,这些组织者提供了在线投票,其当前状态和衍生的未来趋势。

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