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Automatic Search of Meet-in-the-Middle and Impossible Differential Attacks

机译:自动搜索中间相遇和不可能的差分攻击

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Tracking bits through block ciphers and optimizing attacks at hand is one of the tedious task symmetric cryptanalysts have to deal with. It would be nice if a program will automatically handle them at least for well-known attack techniques, so that cryptanalysts will only focus on finding new attacks. However, current automatic tools cannot be used as is, either because they are tailored for specific ciphers or because they only recover a specific part of the attacks and cryptographers are still needed to finalize the analysis. In this paper we describe a generic algorithm exhausting the best meet-in-the-middle and impossible differential attacks on a very large class of block ciphers from byte to bit-oriented, SPN, Feistel and Lai-Massey block ciphers. Contrary to previous tools that target to find the best differential / linear paths in the cipher and leave the cryptanalysts to find the attack using these paths, we automatically find the best attacks by considering the cipher and the key schedule algorithms. The building blocks of our algorithm led to two algorithms designed to find the best simple meet-in-the-middle attacks and the best impossible truncated differential attacks respectively. We recover and improve many attacks on AES, mCRYPTON, SIMON, IDEA, KTANTAN, PRINCE and ZORRO. We show that this tool can be used by designers to improve their analysis.
机译:通过分组密码跟踪比特并优化手头的攻击是对称密码分析员必须处理的繁琐任务之一。如果程序至少可以针对著名的攻击技术自动对其进行处理,那就太好了,这样,密码分析家将只专注于发现新的攻击。但是,当前的自动工具不能按原样使用,这是因为它们是为特定密码量身定制的,或者是因为它们仅恢复了攻击的特定部分,并且仍需要密码专家来完成分析。在本文中,我们描述了一种通用算法,该算法在从字节到面向比特的非常大的分组密码,SPN,Feistel和Lai-Massey分组密码上,会遇到最佳的中间相遇和不可能的差分攻击。与以前的旨在在密码中找到最佳差分/线性路径并让密码分析者使用这些路径查找攻击的工具相反,我们通过考虑密码和密钥调度算法来自动查找最佳攻击。我们的算法的构建模块导致了两种算法,分别设计用于找到最佳的简单中间相遇攻击和最佳的不可能的截断差分攻击。我们恢复并改善了对AES,mCRYPTON,SIMON,IDEA,KTANTAN,PRINCE和ZORRO的攻击。我们证明了设计人员可以使用此工具来改善他们的分析。

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