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EXPLAINING THE SLOW DIFFUSION OF NEW RENEWABLE ENERGY IN THE ARGENTINE ELECTRICITY MARKET: A WRONG POLICY MIX ORAN UNFAVOURABLE CONTEXT?

机译:解释阿根廷电力市场中新可再生能源的缓慢扩散:错误的混合政策或不利的背景?

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OverviewThe production and consumption of electricity in Latin America has grown strongly in recent decades (about 4% per year) with an increasing share coming from fossil fuels, which has led to an increase in the carbon intensity of the electricity production. Large hydro still represents a substantial part of the electricity mix in most Latin-American countries. However, the construction of new dams has slowed mainly due to their local environmental consequences.In the last decade, most of these countries showed a growing interest in developing renewable energy technologies (RETs) for power generation, especially wind, solar, biomass, geothermal and small hydroelectric dams. This interest is explained primarily by the need of diversifying the power mix and increase security of supply. Additionally, other policy objectives have been considered, such as the electrification of isolated rural areas, the decrease of energy imports, the creation of new jobs and the reduction of GHG emissions. The latter goal became especially important after the COP21 (Paris, 2015), in which most countries agreed to follow decarbonisation pathways for their economies which means, among other measures, an increased effort to develop green energy.In this context, governments have set relatively ambitious targets and implemented public policies to encourage investment in RETs and thus take advantage of the great potential available. Different policy instruments have been implemented: tax exemptions, feed-in tariffs, feed-in premium, auction systems, tradable certificates, etc.However, even though many years of government effort and public resources have been invested in order to speed up the development, diffusion and implementation of RETs, experiences in different countries show that this is a very slow process. The current share of RETs is still low (or extremely low depending on the country), especially when compared to the ambitions of policy objectives. Support policies for RETs in Argentina is an interesting case to analyse the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms in a context of high risk perception. Recent experience in the electricity sector shows that the application of several theoretically effectives instruments did not produce the expected results despite the large potential available. Could it be explained by a failure in the design and implementation of the main promotion tools or by one unfavorable economic and institutional context and the related barriers?Theoretical framework and methodThere are two main Economic theories to explain the slow diffusion of RETs. The first is the neo-classical economic paradigm that highlights market failures as the main obstacle. Getting the prices right (by means of taxes, subsidies or similar measures) and public subsidies to compensate for private under-investments in RETs R&D are often proposed solutions. The second group of explanations is based on the evolutionary approaches coupled with a systemic and historical perspective of technological change (Maréchal, 2007). This paradigm highlights the systemic character of innovations and diffusion of new technologies. The technological lock-in process makes it unlikely that traditional cost-efficient measures aimed at internalising external cost will be sufficient to bring about the required radical changes in the field of energy, because they fail to address structural barriers. “Non-economic barriers”-institutional, technical, cultural-are thus an important part of the explanation and would require a wider range of policiesThis paper analyses the interactions between policy tools and barriers from an historic and evolutionary perspective. After a theoretical introduction, it first explains the organization and functioning of the Argentine electricity market. Then, it analyzes the main policy instruments, their implementation and the various barriers that may determine the success or failure of the promotion policy. To achieve this, several step were performed: a deep literature review, an analysis of promotion laws and interviews with key stakeholders (investors, policy makers, energy analysts).ResultsThree main policy instruments have been implemented in the Argentine electricity sector to promote RETs:- The first policy tools for wind and solar energy were approved in 1998 (Law 25.019). It was a feed-in premium system that guaranteed an additional payment above the market price for each kWh of energy produced and injected into the national interconnected grid. The law also provided some tax exemptions for wind and solar projects. Such a system failed due to the freeze on electricity tariffs that occurred after the deep devaluation in 2002. In fact, the imbalance generated by the frozen tariffs facing rapidly growing inflation misrepresented the basis of calculation of the grant. Thus, it provoked an insignificant payment and consequently the inapplicability of this incentive policy.- In 2006 a new law on renewable energy was approved. It has set a target of 8% of electricity production from renewable sources (excluding large hydro) for 2016. To achieve this target, the new law provides incentives including tax exemptions and the payment of premium remuneration. In contrast to the regulatory approach adopted by Chile, the target of 8% in the Argentine law is only indicative, as "obligation" will fall on any particular actor. Moreover, regulation and law-enforcement only came in 2009, without real results.- In 2010 the GENREN auction program was implemented. From this program, competitive auctions to incorporate 1000 MW of renewable power to the national electricity system were organised. In the first tender, projects representing 1,436 MW of total power were proposed, that is to say, an amount 40% higher than requested, which shows the initial great interest of investors in the program. However, most of these projects have yet to be realised.The main obstacle encountered by companies responsible for the projects is the lack of access to financing. First, at the macro-economic level, the international funding of companies is directly affected by the high level of country risk, making it almost impossible to access credit at reasonable rates. Then, most of the participating companies do not have access to the guarantees required by national banks. CAMMESA - a company controlled by the State and responsible for payments of guaranteed prices - presents a balance sheet that does not meet the guarantees required by financial institutions concerning the completion of contracts signed in the field of GENREN project. The lack of confidence has settled despite the existence of guaranteed prices in American dollars with contracts up to 15 years. Thus, only firms with their own funds or with access to internal funding have materialised the renewable projects.ConclusionsIn the Argentinean case, the RET's deployment in the last 20 years was clearly affected by the institutional and economic context –with a big crisis in 2002 and the consequent public control of electricity tariffs. In this high-risk environment, investors have preferred to invest in more conventional and mature technologies or not invest at all. Moreover, we found several problems in the design and implementation of the two first policy instruments (feed-in premium system of 1998 and 2006). The GENREN program was a well-designed economic instrument but it was not accompanied by additional measures to facilitate the funding of projects, i.e. the promotion policies did not respond to the financial failure.More generally, the results show that the malfunctioning of energy markets and also macroeconomic and institutional barriers may prove decisive for the success or failure of promotion policies. The isolated application of economic incentives (like feed-in tariffs, feed-in premium, etc.) may not be enough to promote investment in RETs, especially in developing and emerging countries with a high risk environment. Complementary measures are required: short, medium and long run energy planning, facilitate funding access, facilitate the grid integration of green electricity and education and information diffusion to increase awareness and citizens' participation in RETs projects.
机译:概述 近几十年来,拉丁美洲的电力生产和消费增长强劲(每年约4%),其中化石燃料的份额不断增加,这导致电力生产的碳强度增加。在大多数拉丁美洲国家,大型水力发电仍占电力结构的很大一部分。但是,新水坝的建设速度下降主要是由于其对当地环境的影响。 在过去的十年中,这些国家中的大多数对发展可再生能源技术(RET)以发电尤其是风能,太阳能,生物质能,地热能和小型水电大坝表现出了越来越大的兴趣。这种兴趣主要是因为需要使电源组合多样化并提高供电安全性。此外,还考虑了其​​他政策目标,例如偏远农村地区的电气化,减少能源进口,创造新的就业机会和减少温室气体排放。在COP21(巴黎,2015年)之后,后一个目标变得尤为重要,在COP21中,大多数国家同意遵循其经济的脱碳途径,这意味着除其他措施外,还将加大开发绿色能源的力度。 在这种情况下,政府制定了相对雄心勃勃的目标,并实施了公共政策来鼓励对可再生能源技术的投资,从而充分利用可利用的巨大潜力。已实施了不同的政策工具:免税,上网电价,上网电价溢价,拍卖系统,可交易证书等。 但是,尽管已经投入了许多年的政府努力和公共资源来加速RET的开发,传播和实施,但不同国家的经验表明,这是一个非常缓慢的过程。目前,可再生能源技术的份额仍然很低(根据国家的不同,还是非常低的),尤其是与政策目标的雄心壮志相比。阿根廷针对可再生能源技术的支持政策是一个有趣的案例,可以在高风险感知的背景下分析激励机制的有效性。电力部门的最新经验表明,尽管具有巨大的潜力,但使用几种理论上有效的工具仍未产生预期的结果。是由于主要促销工具的设计和实施失败,还是由于不利的经济和体制环境以及相关障碍所造成的? 理论框架和方法 有两种主要的经济学理论来解释可再生能源的缓慢扩散。首先是新古典主义的经济范式,强调市场失灵是主要障碍。经常提出解决方案,以正确的价格(通过税收,补贴或类似措施)和公共补贴来补偿私人企业在RETs研发方面的投资不足。第二组解释是基于进化方法,结合技术变革的系统和历史视角(Maréchal,2007)。这种范例突出了创新和新技术传播的系统性。技术锁定过程使得旨在内部化外部成本的传统成本有效措施不可能足以带来能源领域所需的根本性变化,因为它们无法解决结构性障碍。因此,“非经济壁垒”(机构,技术,文化)是解释的重要组成部分,将需要更广泛的政策 本文从历史和进化的角度分析了政策工具与壁垒之间的相互作用。在进行理论介绍之后,它首先解释了阿根廷电力市场的组织和运作。然后,它分析了主要的政策工具,其实施以及可能决定升级政策成败的各种障碍。为了实现这一目标,我们执行了几个步骤:深入的文献综述,促销法律分析以及与主要利益相关者(投资者,政策制定者,能源分析师)的访谈。 结果 阿根廷电力部门已实施了三项主要政策工具来促进可再生能源技术的发展: -1998年批准了首个风能和太阳能政策工具(第25.019号法律)。这是一种上网电价溢价系统,对于每生产和注入国家互联电网的每千瓦时能源,它保证以高于市场价格的价格额外支付费用。该法律还为风能和太阳能项目提供了一些免税政策。由于2002年大幅贬值后冻结了电价,所以这种制度失败了。实际上,由于冻结的电价面临迅速增长的通货膨胀而产生的不平衡,错误地代表了赠款的计算基础。因此,因此引发了微不足道的付款,因此该激励政策不适用。 -2006年,通过了一部有关可再生能源的新法律。它设定了2016年将可再生能源(不包括大型水电)发电量的8%的目标。为实现这一目标,新法律提供了包括免税和支付高额报酬在内的激励措施。与智利采用的监管方法相反,阿根廷法律中的8%的目标只是指示性的,因为“义务”将落在任何特定行为者身上。而且,法规和执法只是在2009年才出现,没有实际结果。 -2010年,GENREN拍卖计划得以实施。通过该计划,组织了竞争性拍卖,将1000兆瓦的可再生能源纳入国家电力系统。在第一次招标中,提出了代表总发电量1,436兆瓦的项目,也就是说,比要求的数量高40%,这表明了投资者对该计划的最初浓厚兴趣。但是,这些项目大多数尚未实现。 负责项目的公司遇到的主要障碍是缺乏融资渠道。首先,在宏观经济层面,公司的国际资金直接受到国家高风险的影响,因此几乎不可能以合理的利率获得信贷。这样,大多数参与公司无法获得国家银行要求的担保。 CAMMESA是一家由国家控制并负责支付保证价格的公司,其资产负债表不符合金融机构就GENREN项目领域签订的合同而要求的担保。尽管存在长达15年的合同保证的美元价格保证,但缺乏信心得到了解决。因此,只有拥有自有资金或能够获得内部资金的公司才能实现可再生项目。 结论 在阿根廷的情况下,可再生能源技术在过去20年的部署显然受到制度和经济背景的影响-2002年发生了严重危机,并因此对电费实行了公共控制。在这种高风险的环境中,投资者倾向于投资于更传统和更成熟的技术,或者根本不投资。此外,我们在设计和实施两项首个政策工具(1998年和2006年的电价保险制度)时发现了一些问题。 GENREN计划是一种精心设计的经济手段,但没有附带旨在促进项目融资的额外措施,即,促销政策未对财务失败做出反应。 更广泛地说,结果表明,能源市场的失灵以及宏观经济和制度障碍可能对促进政策的成败起决定性作用。单独应用经济激励措施(如上网电价,上网电价溢价等)可能不足以促进对可再生能源技术的投资,尤其是在具有高风险环境的发展中国家和新兴国家中。需要采取补充措施:短期,中期和长期能源规划,促进资金获取,促进绿色电力与教育的网格整合以及信息传播,以提高人们的意识和公民对可再生能源技术项目的参与。

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