Conditions of Depleting Offender Behavior in Volunteering Dilemma: An Agent-Based Simulation Study

摘要

In this paper, an agent-based model of bystanders effect on volunteering in a crime situation is presented. The model is pivoted on the results of a game-theoretic experimentation of the volunteering dilemma, emphasizing the role of guilt in increasing the volunteering tendency. An analytical model of bystanders effect on volunteering is extended so that it incorporates multiple interventions and changes in agents' beliefs to be used in subsequent interactions. However, the main contribution is the model extension including the guilt propagation, subsequently responsible for increases in volunteering tendency. We also introduce a new model of offender behavior, that operates in conjunction with the model of volunteering. The model is simulated asking interesting "what-if" questions with particular focus on decreasing offending tendencies. The results of the simulation reveal that, the model we have proposed, validates the theoretical foundations of bystanders effect on volunteering and importance of guilt in increasing the volunteering tendency.