OVERLAPPING INTERNATIONAL GREEN RD AGREEMENTS

摘要

The findings depend on whether or not transfers are allowed within coalitions. If transfers are allowed, wefind that the size of a stable multilateral agreement increases as the size of the global economy expands in theabsence of attrition. We also demonstrate that for positive attrition rates all types of coalition structures can bestable as the size of the global economy expands. However, a stable agreement will never involve full participation.On the other hand, if transfers are not allowed, the stable agreement will involve all nations in the globe providedthe attrition rate is small enough. Several other arrangements, with participation of almost all nations in the globe,are shown to be stable depending on the value of the attrition rate. Our findings enable us to conjecture that thecurrent international green R&D networks may be self-enforcing and may still increase in size, in spite of the greatlikelihood that they are characterized by significant attrition.