The Evolution of Dual-Use Export Controls: From Control List to End-user Controls? June 2014 INMM 54th Conference

摘要

Often norms of conduct evolve faster than the ability of legal structures. In the field of export controls, traditional implementation has relied on identifying potential denials based on licensing using control lists. Following the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program in the 1990's, control lists evolved to encompass dual-use items, rather than just trigger list items, and the non-proliferation clause, or catch-all clause, was developed. The clause enables authorities to issue denials for non-listed items if the item is suspected as contributing to WMD. Due to a number of geopolitical factors described in the following article, states are becoming more comfortable with using the catch-all clause to block exports of concern. This article seeks to answer the question of whether control lists are necessary any longer, and if so, how they could evolve in structure and legal content to adapt to current state practice. This paper would examine the future of export controls and question the current role that control lists play in implementation.