In spectrum trading markets, auctions are organized by spectrum holders (SHs) to distribute channels. As buyers, wireless service providers (WSPs) acquire channels to deploy services to end users. To optimize the profits, it is essential for the WSPs to determine their bidding strategies, which are affected by two key aspects: the service position to the end users and the auction schemes enforced by the SH. In this paper, we jointly study the strategy of the SH in the auction design and the WSPs' strategies in the service provisions and biddings. The WSP's optimal strategy in the auction can be flexible in term of demands and valuations. To optimize social welfare and enable the WSPs to reveal truthful flexible demands, we design Flexauc, a novel auction mechanism for the SH. We prove theoretically that Flexauc not only maximizes the social welfare but also preserves other nice properties: truthfulness and computational tractability.
展开▼
