Stable Two-Sided Matching of Slot Allocation in Airport Collaborative Decision Making

摘要

The Airport Collaborative Decision Making (A-CDM) is a new paradigm of Air Traffic Management, which takes into account the preferences of Air Traffic Control (ATC) units and those of the airlines. This inherently leads to only satisfying the preferences of a limited number of stakeholders within the airport area. Using the matching approach for two-sided markets of Game Theory, Deferred Acceptance CDM (DA-CDM) developed an expansion of the philosophy of CDM and aggregated with the Ground Delay Program (GDP). In this paper we reformulate the DA-CDM model with a mathematic approved theory. We concentrated the manipulation of the politic mechanism in compression step of slot allocation in order to allow the user to include preferences of airport managers in addition to the ATC agents and airlines. This paper approved the stable manipulation in the DA-CDM process and also evaluated this manipulation by case study.