On defense strategies for system of systems using aggregated correlations

摘要

We consider a System of Systems (SoS) wherein each system S, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, is composed of discrete cyber and physical components which can be attacked and reinforced. We characterize the disruptions using aggregate failure correlation functions given by the conditional failure probability of SoS given the failure of an individual system. We formulate the problem of ensuring the survival of SoS as a game between an attacker and a provider, each with a utility function composed of a survival probability term and a cost term, both expressed in terms of the number of components attacked and reinforced. The survival probabilities of systems satisfy simple product-form, first-order differential conditions, which simplify the Nash Equilibrium (NE) conditions. We derive the sensitivity functions that highlight the dependence of SoS survival probability at NE on cost terms, correlation functions, and individual system survival probabilities. We apply these results to a simplified model of distributed cloud computing infrastructure.