As a starting point in developing a new vehicle, Design-To-Safety is a matter of craft architecture and mission analysis as well. For some part of the process, it becomes a matter of design margins and either hardware or software redundancies. Ultimately it impacts the Maximum Take-Off Weight of any vehicle for a given set of functional needs and then the request for more powerful propulsion for a given performance or reduced performance alternatively. According to energy at stake when addressing space related missions, it explains largely why space Launch systems favor reliability over design-to-safety when developing a new launch system. Safety of flight for third parties (on ground) or crew on board is managed another way when compared to aeronautics. For former parties, it is a matter of safety range down the track of a launch sequence : in case of rocket getting out the safety range, the craft is disabled. For latter parties (astronauts) dedicated crew escape systems are favored as far as practical and depending on the Space Launch System architecture. As soon as the business model imposes to offer an aeronautic-like safety level, impact to vehicle and mission (flight operations) design greatly differs from legacy rocket, either expendable or reusable. Indeed transporting paying passengers with a fleet of vehicles in different locations worldwide flying hundreds a time a year imposes to shift the design-to-safety paradigm of space business. This paper provides examples of how design-to-safety weights the set of trades-off when developing a suborbital reusable spacecraft with Astrium Spaceplane being a meaningful showcase. It is detailed how it blends properly aeronautic and space best practices from safety perspective. Here are not addressed other safety aspects which relate to project organization especially : project management, staff training, and ground maintenance policy e.g.
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