The renegotiation of nuclear cooperation agreements or negotiation of new agreements could provide U.S. officialsopportunities to strengthen and standardize requirements for accounting for and reporting on foreign-obligatednuclear materials. The requirements for these materials vary widely from one nuclear cooperation agreement toanother. Most agreements do not require facility-level reporting and reconciliation; and the U.S. material accountingsystem that manages the database of U.S.-obligated materials overseas and foreign-obligated materials within theUnited States (the Nuclear Materials Management & Safeguard System [NMMSS]) does not currently provide thefrequency and detail of information necessary to support current nuclear security and nonproliferation demands.U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements are also saddled with the dual and sometimes-competing mandates ofpromoting U.S. economic and security interests. To improve its accounting and reporting on foreign-obligatedmaterials, the United States should consider adopting standard language that requires foreign partners to conductdetailed nuclear material accounting and to report information, such as the quantity, status, and location of U.S.-obligated materials, back to U.S. authorities on a regular basis. Regular material reconciliations should also berequired. Regular facility-level reporting could also be required for most if not all states. In support of this change,NMMSS capabilities could also be augmented.
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