We previously proposed an approach to nuclear warhead verification envi-sioning an inspection system that a priori avoids detection of sensitive information, using aso-called zero-knowledge protocol. Under such a protocol, the host can prove to an inspec-tor that a warhead is authentic without revealing anything about its materials or design.The challenge remains, however, to demonstrate a practical implementation of such a systemthat can detect relevant violations and avoids even the possibility of snooping on electronicmeasurements as they are made. In this article, we examine the use of superheated drop (orubble") detectors to detect neutrons from active interrogation of an unclassified test objectwith 14.1-MeV neutrons. Zero-knowledge is achieved by the host pre-loading individual de-tectors so that they are opped up" by the measurement itself to a previously agreed-upon,unclassified reference value. The required preloads are determined by the host prior to theinspection, but remain unknown to the inspector. The viability of the method is examinedwith MCNP5 Monte Carlo neutron transport calculations modeling the experimental setup,an investigation of a diversion scenario, and a mathematical analysis of the detected data.
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