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Game Study on Collusion in the First-price Sealed-bid Reverse Auction

机译:一价密封竞价反向拍卖中串通的博弈研究

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摘要

Collusion between suppliers in reverse auctions may damage buyers' benefits and then lower efficiency of resource allocation.Under first-price sealed-bid reverse auction mechanism,suppliers' equilibrium bidding strategy and buyers' revenue loss was analyzed considering collusion.Then some general conclusions were given:suppliers' bidding strategy is relevant to some factors such as valuation costs,the number of suppliers and Cartel;the number of suppliers and Carter can lead to buyers revenue loss.Finally,considering two different kinds of distribution function,the strategies of improving buyer's revenue were discressed.
机译:在逆向拍卖中,供应商之间的合谋可能损害买方的利益,进而降低资源分配效率。在第一价格密封竞标机制下,考虑了合谋,分析了供应商的均衡竞价策略和买方的收益损失。给出:供应商的报价策略与估价成本,供应商数量和卡特尔数量有关;供应商数量和卡特数量会导致买家收益减少。最后,考虑两种不同的分配函数,提出了改进策略。买方的收入受到了限制。

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