Test results are presented from over-the-air civil GPSspoofing tests from a non-negligible stand-off distance. distance.These tests were performed at White SandsMissile Range (WSMR) against two systems dependenton civil GPS, a civilian unmanned aerial vehicle(UAV) and a GPS time-reference receiver used in“smart grid” measurement devices. The tests againstthe civil UAV demonstrated that the UAV could behijacked by a GPS spoofer by altering the UAV’s perceivedlocation. The tests against the time-referencereceiver demonstrated the spoofer’s capability of preciselycontrolling timing from a distance, which meansa spoofer could manipulate measurements used forsmart grid control without requiring physical accessto the measurement devices. Implications of spoofingattacks against each of these systems are also given.Recommendations are presented for regulations regardingGPS receivers used in critical infrastructureapplications. These recommendations include creatinga certification process by which receivers are declaredspoof-resistant if they are able to detect or mitigatespoofing attacks in a set of canned scenarios.The recommendations also call for a mandate thatonly spoof-resistant receivers be used in applicationsclassified by the Department of Homeland Security(DHS) as national critical infrastructure.
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