The next generation of arms-control agreements may require increased verification regimes to achieve new ambitious objectives that have not been implemented in any past or current agreements. Increased verification would need to be more intrusive to achieve confidence that states are complying with their obligations, which could include verifying nuclear warheads and weapon dismantlement. Any such agreement must ensure compliance to achieve strategic stability, but cannot risk the disclosure of sensitive information. New technologies based on radiation detection have been developed, or are being developed to meet this challenge. This paper is part one of a two-part project being conducted for the 2018 Nuclear Scholars Initiative hosted by the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI), that examines how new technologies may affect the structure of future hypothetical treaties. Part one of this work identifies emerging technologies based on radiation detection and how they could be deployed in an agreement. It also examines what structures could be included in a hypothetical agreement. Part two will create a hypothetical arms-control agreement that uses the identified technologies and treaty structures to evaluate which technologies are suited to verify different objectives in the scenario. Gaps that currently exist and would benefit from future technical development will also be explored. Part two will be submitted for publication to PONI.
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