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Game analysis of government and company in the prevention of water disaster in the coal mine

机译:政府与公司预防煤矿水灾的博弈分析

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The water disaster restricts the safe production of coal industry severely. During the process of prevention of water disaster, the interest conflicts of every relevant side influence the efficiency of prevention severely. This study selects the local government and coal company as the interest subjects in the prevention of water disaster; firstly the coordination model using the complete information static game theory is established between the two subjects; then the mixed Nash Equilibrium Strategic Function of the model is solved, and the corresponding prevention strategy is proposed according to model's result. Finally the degree of the influence of increase and decrease of the decisive payoff function on the decisions of local government and coal companies is analyzed by this model based on empirical research. The research shows that in order to prevent the coal mine water disaster effectively, it is necessary to strengthen the supervision of the central government to the local government, increase the input of safety investment of coal company actively, and reduce the punishment cost of the local government reasonably.
机译:水灾严重制约了煤炭工业的安全生产。在水灾防治过程中,各方的利益冲突严重影响了防治的效率。本研究选择地方政府和煤炭公司作为预防水灾的关注对象。首先在两个主体之间建立了基于完全信息静态博弈理论的协调模型。然后解决了该模型的混合纳什均衡策略功能,并根据模型结果提出了相应的预防策略。最后,基于实证研究,通过模型分析了决定性收益函数的增减对地方政府和煤炭企业决策的影响程度。研究表明,为有效预防煤矿水灾,有必要加强中央政府对地方政府的监督,积极增加煤炭公司安全投资投入,降低地方处罚成本。合理的政府。

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