首页> 外文会议>2011 Sixth International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security >A Complexity Based Forensic Analysis of the Trojan Horse Defence
【24h】

A Complexity Based Forensic Analysis of the Trojan Horse Defence

机译:基于复杂度的特洛伊木马防御取证分析

获取原文
获取外文期刊封面目录资料

摘要

The Operational Complexity Model (OCM) has been used to derive the complexities of the five most prevalent cyber-crimes occurring in southeast Asia, namely peer-to-peer (P2P) multimedia piracy, online auction fraud, online storage of offensive material, theft of online game weapons, and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. In each case the complexity of the simplest Trojan horse process that might be invoked as an alternative explanation for the recovered digital evidence is also determined using the OCM, and the results are used to assess the relative plausibility of the two competing explanations in each case. Finally, the forensically determined circumstances under which a Trojan horse defence is most likely to be successful are outlined.
机译:运营复杂性模型(OCM)已用于推导东南亚五种最普遍的网络犯罪的复杂性,即对等(P2P)多媒体盗版,在线拍卖欺诈,在线攻击材料的存储,盗窃在线游戏武器以及分布式拒绝服务(DDoS)攻击。在每种情况下,还可以使用OCM确定最简单的特洛伊木马程序的复杂性(可能用作对已恢复的数字证据的替代解释),并且将结果用于评估每种情况下两种竞争解释的相对合理性。最后,概述了在法医确定的情况下最有可能成功进行特洛伊木马防御的情况。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号