首页> 外文会议>EMEM 2010;International conference of environment materials and environment management >The game analysis of negative externality of environmental logistics and government regulation
【24h】

The game analysis of negative externality of environmental logistics and government regulation

机译:环境物流负外部性与政府规制的博弈分析

获取原文

摘要

This paper mainly discuss the negative externality problems involved in environmental logistics and the necessity of government regulation,and the government's role in resolving negative externality.In the process of environmental logistics,around the interest distribution after the internalization of external cost,it exists a series of games among parties of logistics systems,including game between enterprises and environment,game between enterprises and game between government and enterprises.Through the analysis of game model,we conclude that environmental logistics cannot only rely on the market forces,the government should play a greater role.The economic incentives based on market are the most effective way to resolve negative externality and at the same time we should avoid rent-seeking behavior.The government should accelerate the process of environmental logistics in China by increasing the intensity of propaganda of environmental logistics,making evaluation standard of environmental logistics,carrying out financial subsidies on environmental logistics,and guiding enterprises participating the technology development of environmental logistics.
机译:本文主要讨论环境物流中的负外部性问题和政府规制的必要性,以及政府在解决负外部性方面的作用。在环境物流过程中,围绕外部成本内在化后的利益分配,存在一系列物流系统各方之间的博弈,包括企业与环境之间的博弈,企业与环境之间的博弈以及政府与企业之间的博弈。通过博弈模型的分析,我们得出结论,环境物流不能仅仅依靠市场力量,政府应该发挥作用。发挥更大的作用。基于市场的经济激励措施是解决负外部性的最有效方法,同时我们应避免寻租行为。政府应通过加大对环境的宣传力度来加快中国的环境物流进程。物流,制定环境评价标准物流,对环境物流进行财政补贴,指导企业参与环境物流技术的发展。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号